Today's definition: Mug's game: a useless or illadvised venture carried out by a gullible person.
Today's case: We'd just completed the first-ever RCT showing that aspirin (but not sulfinpyrazone) reduced the risk of stroke and death among patients with transient ischemic attacks.* We were elated with our primary results and already dreaming of a lead article in the New England Journal of Medicine. There were just a few odds and ends to attend to, and one of them was analyzing an end-of-study questionnaire we'd given to our collaborating neurologists to confirm that our efforts to keep them blind had been successful. Our trial had employed a 'double-dummy' factorial design in which patients were randomized to both active drugs, to active aspirin and placebo sulfinpyrazone, to placebo aspirin and active sulfinpyrazone, or to both placebos. Consequently, when we asked our neurologists which regimen they thought each of their patients had received, they would have guessed correctly for 25% of them on the basis of chance alone. Any big increase in this rate of correct responses would be worrisome, and a statistically significant difference would suggest that our attempts to blind them had failed.
'I felt the bullet enter my heart' [1] when our co-PI statistician tracked me down on the ward to tell me that our clinicians' correct guesses were, indeed, statistically significantly different from 25%. Had our triumphant lead article just been reduced to an apologetic Letter to the Editor? And why did my co-PI have a big grin on his face?
I have lots of textbooks on how to do 'doubleblind'
y RCTs [2] , and (except for one recent revision) all of them recommend end-of-study tests for blindness on both patients and providers. They go on to warn that greater-than-chance correct guesses raise real concerns about whether blinding was successful, and that when this occurs, trial reports should admit these failures and temper their conclusions accordingly.
Moreover, reviews of published RCTs have found that these textbook recommendations are rarely reported. Isabelle Boutron led a review of 90 trials obtained from several bibliographic databases and concluded: 'Methods of assessing the success of blinding, analysis and reporting the results were inconsistent and questionable.' [3] . Testing for blinding was reported in only 8% of the random sample of 199 general medicine and psychiatry RCTs published in 1998-2001 assessed by Dean Fergusson and his colleagues [4] and in only 2% of a random sample of 1599 RCTs published in 2001 and drawn from the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials by Asbjorn Hrobjartsson's team [5] . Gloomier still (at least in these authors' eyes), in the rare instances in which tests were carried out, blinding was judged to have been successful only one-third to one-half of the time.
As with cointervention in our previous Round, understanding the measurement of blinding requires the synthesis of methodological and clinical competence. The key question in this Round is: What are you really measuring when you measure 'blindness' at the end of your trial? And the quick answer is: You may not be measuring blindness at all! Which brings us back to today's case: Why, in light of the fact that our clinical collaborators' correct guesses were statistically significantly different from 25%, was my co-PI grinning? His reasons were two: First, their guesses were statistically significantly wrong! Second, he'd also analyzed their predictions (obtained at that same time, before we'd broken the code for them) about the efficacy of our two study drugs. They got that wrong, too. Most of them predicted that aspirin would be worthless but sulfinpyrazone would be effective. Now stop reading for a moment, think like a clinician-trialist, and see if you can explain this mess.
I reckon the penny has now dropped (at least for most of you): With a 'prior' belief that sulfinpyrazone was effective, when a patient fared well throughout the trial, it was clinically sensible for their neurologist to suspect that they were on it. Similarly, if a patient suffered a stroke during the trial, it was clinically sensible for their neurologist to suspect the double placebo or the aspirin they thought was probably worthless. Thus, our end-ofstudy test for blindness was exposed as a test for (incorrect) hunches about efficacy. We successfully explained these results to the journal's Editor (if not to one persistently confused referee) and got the trial published [6] .
So, the first 'pearl' on offer from this Round is that testing trial participants and clinical collaborators for blindness at the end of your trial is a mug's game, because it cannot distinguish the failure of your blinding tactics from their correct guesses about which treatment was received, based on their experiences of pharmacodynamics, side-effects, and trial outcomes [7] . Put more colourfully, Stephen Senn [8] has argued: 'The whole point of a successful double-blind trial is that there should be unblinding through efficacy [8] .' And, most important, the folks who created and maintain the CONSORT Statement on how to report randomized trials have now come to this same conclusion: 'Regardless of the ultimate success of blinding, tests of the success of blinding might actually be tests of hunches on harms, side-effects, or efficacy.' [9] . Accordingly, they revoked their previous recommendation to report 'how the success of blinding was evaluated,' and: 'In CONSORT 2010, we have removed mention of how the success of blinding might have been evaluated. ' The second 'pearl' is the admonition that blinding yy should never be considered an end in itself. It is merely a tactic applied to achieve far more important purposes, and that it is the achievement of these greater purposes that warrants measurement and monitoring once your trial is underway. Successful blinding protects your trial from three threats to 'fair comparisons,' the contamination of the comparison group with the experimental treatment, the unequal application of an efficacious cointervention to experimental and comparison participants, and the consciously -or unconsciously -biased reporting of trial outcomes that occurs when observers know the treatment allocation of the participants they are assessing. Your trial participants and clinical collaborators can't contaminate, unequally cointervene, or fudge their outcome reporting to favour one arm of a trial if they don't know who is in it. The point here is that contamination, unequal cointervention, and biased outcome-assessment should be among the prime targets you monitor once your trial is underway, not the increasingly ambiguous measurement of 'blinding.' You should monitor and confirm that the assigned tablets and potions contain the correct agents, and -when necessary and feasible -that trial participants' clinical examinations, blood, and body fluids confirm they are continuing to receive their allocated treatments. Thus, in the Canadian Aspirin Trial that opened this Round, treatment allocations had been concealed; active drugs and their corresponding placebos were identical in size, color, taste, smell and flotation; we'd told everybody to use acetaminophen for pain; we'd purged uric acid results from all lab reports (sulfinpyrazone is uricosuric); and we'd kept our periodic platelet function test results secret.
We've discussed the monitoring for and introduced four strategies for preventing, unequal cointerventions in our last Round [10] , where we encountered that trial of fenofibrate in which unequal (excess) cointervention with statins among control patients was not only detected, but also relegated fenofibrate's observed effect on coronary events into the realm of statistical nonsignificance [11] .
Biased outcome assessment is usually prevented by submitting events (plus some near-and nonevents) to a panel of adjudicators who are blind to treatment. The importance of this safeguard was powerfully confirmed in an RCT of cyclophosphamide, prednisone, and plasma exchange among patients with multiple sclerosis (MS) [12] . Trial participants were periodically examined by two yy The clinician-trialist Carl Kupfer, honored elsewhere in this issue for his pioneering RCTs in ophthalmology, preferred the term 'masking' in those trials, and it is now sometimes used as a synonym for 'blinding.' groups of neurologists, one group blind to their treatment groups and the other unblind. The blind neurologists found no effect of the treatments on patient-outcomes, but the unblind neurologists concluded that triple therapy was efficacious.
The third and final 'pearl' offered here is that you should establish your blinding strategies and tactics -and test, revise, and retest them until they work -in the pre-trial pilot phase of your trial. As in the Canadian Aspirin Trial, are your experimental and comparison medications identical? Can their side-effects or pharmacodynamics be replicated? Is everyone who needs to be blind (patients, those who care for and monitor them and are therefore at risk of unequally cointervening, those who decide whether they've had an event, etc.) actually blind during your pilot? Perseverance and creativity are in demand at this stage: I once monitored a trial of oral vs. intravenous anti-thrombotics which returned both real and bogus lab results and doseinstructions to the nurse specialists who both cared for study patients and triggered their testing for trial end-points, and I'm currently working with a vascular surgeon to 'deafen' (rather than blind) earphone-wearing MS patients undergoing real vs. sham venoplasty for their chronic cerebrospinal venous insufficiency (CCSVI) by feeding all of them the same recording of a prior venoplasty.
I conclude this Clinician-Trialist Round by returning to the case that opened it, and offer a bone-chilling alternative ending. What if the neurologists in our TIA trial had begun it with the reverse set of hunches, this time thinking that aspirin would probably work and sulfinpyrazone probably wouldn't? Testing for blindness at the end of that trial -forcing us to weaken our conclusions about efficacy and dashing our hopes of prominent publication -certainly would have been a mug's game! As usual, that's not the end of this Round, for our discussion period has just begun. Rounders who have encountered equally informative cases, have other and better ideas for achieving blinding and preventing the harms that arise from its loss, or have questions or comments about the ones presented here, are encouraged to send them to the Editors, with a copy to me at sackett@bmts.com. I'll summarize them in a later Round.
And again, as usual, I thank my patients, students, and colleagues for helping me recognize, begin to understand, and write about this challenging intersection between clinical care and clinical trials.
